Free Trade Agreements and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility: How These Institutions Target Poverty in Developing Countries by Thomas, Tucker
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 12 | Number 4 Article 13
2006
Free Trade Agreements and the Poverty Reduction
and Growth Facility: How These Institutions
Target Poverty in Developing Countries
Tucker Thomas
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Comment and Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
and Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tucker Thomas, Free Trade Agreements and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility: How These Institutions Target Poverty in Developing
Countries, 12 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 571 (2006)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol12/iss4/13
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE
POVERTY REDUCTION AND




HEN researching the Dominican Republic Central American
Trade Agreement of 2005 (CAFTA-DR) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), it is easy and tempting to let the eyes
gloss over several presumptions, namely that both of these institutions
are capable of doing what they set out to do. Despite being entirely dif-
ferent frameworks, both seek, among other things, to reduce poverty and
raise the living standard in their target countries.1 But, as this paper
hopes to illustrate, these entities seek to create binding, legal agreements
on what is really a very vague and undefined term: poverty. The reality
of these agreements will be studied beyond such conclusory equations as:
free trade reduces poverty. In addition to analyzing how these two inter-
national agreements reduce poverty, this paper will also focus on the le-
gal ramifications and enforcement of these international agreements.
Nicaragua and Honduras will serve as examples of how these frameworks
address poverty, as they are both signatories of CAFTA-DR and both
receive aid under the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF).2 Before proceeding to the analysis of the frameworks them-
selves, the concept of poverty must be analyzed. To best peel away the
presumptions connecting poverty reduction to these international agree-
ments, it is necessary to start at the beginning with a definition of poverty.
•A recent graduate of SMU Dedman School of Law and Duke University, Tucker
Thomas served as an editor for the International Law Review Association, during
which time he drafted this comment. Since receiving his juris doctor in May 2006
and his State Bar license in November 2006, Tucker currently practices law as a
real estate attorney in the Dallas area.
1. The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, pmbl., Aug. 2, 2005, 119 Stat. 462 [hereinafter CAFTA-DR].
2. Id.; see also IMF Factsheet, Aug. 6, 2006: Countries Eligible for the IMF Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/
prgf.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006) [hereinafter PRGF].
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I. INTRODUCTION TO POVERTY
Poverty is one of those elusive and widespread problems that everyone
loathes, yet no one can solve. Even its absolute definition eludes those
altruistic enough to stare it in the face. Poverty is defined by its inverse: it
is "the state of one who lacks a usual or socially acceptable amount of
money or material possessions."'3 Poverty is also synonymous with want,
which is the lack of what is necessary or required. 4 In reality this tells us
very little about the nature of poverty. If you take an individual and sift
him or her down to his or her most basic needs, the last need standing is
self-preservation. With this in mind, what is necessary begins to emerge.
By concentrating on the individual human being and his or her core ne-
cessities, there are truly only a few requirements for self-preservation,
such as access to potable water, food, shelter, and medical treatment.
These are the absolute necessities to sustain life.
But, if you instead try to define poverty at the macroeconomic level of,
for example, an international marketplace, the definition of what is nec-
essary or required expands. When defining preservation (and poverty) at
the level of non-human economic entities and nations, not only is the
definition subject to this new set of requirements but the basic require-
ments themselves become complicated. Consider again for a moment the
typical human being. If a human ingests something necessary to preserve
itself, such as food, the typical human being's stomach will digest it, and it
will pass everything along and make the most of this requirement. The
typical stomach does not go on strike; the esophagus does not expropriate
the food for a political rally or to aid in bombarding the tongue to settle
an old feud. When faced with the choice of using a good to preserve
itself, a factory, a government, a local marketplace, worker, a company,
corporate alliances, national markets, and even the fabled global market-
place, however, might go on strike or expropriate the necessary
requirements.
But, to understand this, we must define the necessary requirements for
these large, macroeconomic entities. They can be: job skills, education,
technological research and development, human and physical capital, in-
frastructure, trade agreements, strategy, or diplomacy. A combination of
these requisites must be obtained in order to survive the marketplace at
any level from the street vendor to the national economy.
A. PREMATURE SOLUTIONS TO POVERTY
While it makes sense that the lack of these requirements is the defini-
tion of poverty, consider the consequence of such poverty. The obvious
risk of lacking what is necessary to survive is the risk of physical or mar-
ket death, unless some sort of remedy or influx of the necessary matter is
3. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, Definition of Poverty, http://www.m-w.com/
dictionary/poverty (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
4. Id.; cf Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, Definition of Want, http://www.m-
w.com/dictionary/want (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
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inserted into the ailing individual or entity. It may not mean certain
death to live without a combination of these necessary elements, but it
will force the entity or individual to scramble to survive. Such conse-
quences will lead the individual or entity to seek aid from outside sources,
especially if there is an inequality of these necessaries. First, consider
again the impoverished individual.
The inability of an individual to provide him or her self with medical
treatment or potable water presents two options. The most common and
sensible option is to seek those necessary elements from another individ-
ual or entity. Initially, the individual may seek the lacking element from
his neighbors who do possess the missing element. The respondent
neighbor may elect to trade the ailing individual a requirement for a re-
quirement or a requirement for a caprice, if inequality is present. If ine-
quality is so great, the neighbor may, however, decide to generously give
the requirement or share in it with his neighbor, which leads to the next
option. The second option open to an individual is to approach a higher
authority for aid. If, alternatively, the ailing individual approaches the
government, then the government may provide that remedy without bur-
dening the ailing individual (directly). Consequently, this person ceases
to be impoverished (at least for the present). And so emerges the para-
digm of open-trade and post-depression welfare economics in a very sim-
plified form.
Now, consider how the macroeconomic entity will perform these two
options. It appears, before much analysis, that the solutions work. By
offering incentives to its neighboring nation, the ailing nation can trade
and barter its possessions into a more sustainable position with other
neighboring nations. Or, more realistically, the nations can reduce trade
restrictions and better facilitate trade between their private sectors, creat-
ing a harmonious intergovernmental system of trade that sustains life on
both ends. The second option has only recently become an option for
impoverished or developing nations. With the advent of new interna-
tional banking agencies, there is a higher authority available to bestow
aid on an entire nation. Preventing the demise of governments has been
one of the functions of these institutions, who like a super government,
collect capital from many nations and disperse it to the ailing nations.
These two solutions are used in the real world by nations seeking to
enter into free trade agreements or pleading for relief from an interna-
tional lending agency. Before concluding that both of these options are
completely viable for an impoverished nation, this paper will further in-
vestigate the manner that these entities provide their functions. It is the
purpose of this paper to demonstrate that what works for a human being
does not necessarily work for a macroeconomic entity. Delivering food
to a nation by airdrop does not necessarily satiate the starving quotient of
a country, but delivering food into the mouth of a starving individual will
satiate that individual's hunger. Such concerns burst the seams of this
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seemingly simple solution to poverty. This paper seeks to address these
two accepted methods of widespread, national poverty reduction.
B. BETTER DEFINING THE POVERTY PROBLEM
Before delving into a detailed analysis of free trade agreements and
international lending, the problem of poverty at a national level needs to
be better understood by focusing on the concept of measuring poverty.
The decision of how to measure poverty has sparked its own debate. 5
Before measurement can begin, there are two different schools on how to
quantify poverty. This distinction splits poverty into two categories, ei-
ther "absolute poverty" or "relative poverty."'6 The first step is to decide
what method to adopt. Once that has been established, the second pre-
liminary step is to observe how pervasive poverty is before proceeding
along with the case studies.
1. Measuring Poverty
Poverty is a moving target. The social data used to define it is usually
gathered by censuses, surveys, and the like, but in a country wracked by
funding or political problems, the collection of such data becomes hin-
dered and inconsistent. For example, in Nicaragua, during the tumultu-
ous regime of the Sandinistas, the country neglected to conduct an
agricultural census, creating a twenty-seven-year gap in demographic
data.7 Additionally, those surveys that do get conducted are sometimes
contradictory. 8 With such varying and contradictory results, studying
poverty becomes very difficult.
The first step in measuring poverty is drawing the poverty line. 9 Here
is where the absolute poverty and relative poverty debate enters the fray.
The former fixes the poverty line at a set point. This is usually done at
the cost of living, measured at one dollar per day. 10 This amount is then
balanced so that one country can see its poverty in relation to another.
But, due to inflation and varying currency exchange rates, this figure is
inaccurate. Therefore, pure exchange-rate dollars are converted into
purchasing power parity (PPP), adjusting the exchange-rate dollar
5. Some commentators are less careful about an equally important distinction linger-
ing under the surface of the globalization debate - between the ideas of 'relative
poverty' and 'absolute poverty.' . . . Economists have traditionally assumed that
people only care about their own consumption, but there is now a body of evi-
dence suggesting that people do hold 'social preferences,' and that relative depri-
vation is an important determinant of welfare and behavior.
Martin Ravallion, The Debate on Globalization, Poverty, and Inequality: Why Mea-
surement Matters 4 (World Bank Dev. Research Group, Working Paper No. 3038,
2003).
6. Relative poverty is like a measurement of inequality. Id.
7. REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA, A STRENGTHENED GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUC-
TION STRATEGY 5 (2001), http://www.imf.org/External/NP/prsp/20O1/nic/O1/
073101.pdf [hereinafter NICARAGUA PRSP].
8. See Ravallion, supra note 5, at 2.
9. Id. at 9.
10. Id.
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amount to a pre-determined cost of certain goods. 1
On the other hand, proponents of a relative poverty scheme advocate a
shifting poverty line that varies "with the mean income of some relevant
reference group."'12 Note that, under this theory, if poverty decreases
(i.e., the lacking requisites are supplied across the board), then the pov-
erty line will move to indicate that the same persons are still impover-
ished relative to the wealthy (unless by supplying them, total equality is
achieved). For this reason, using a scaling poverty line makes less sense
as it contradicts the very definition of poverty, i.e., the lack of what is
necessary and becomes instead a measurement of inequality. When a
person gains what is necessary, then that person should cease being classi-
fied as impoverished. Only then should inequality be considered.
This measurement debate stops the struggle to solve poverty before it
starts. Instead of concerning themselves with how best to use funds to
attack the most extreme forms of poverty, many economists are con-
cerned with the perceptions of the poor and how they perceive them-
selves in relation to the haves of society. This paper will not resolve this
debate in favor of either side, but in the case of extreme poverty, the
argument, to measure in terms of relative poverty, seems capricious when
individuals themselves do not have the basic needs and educations to sus-
tain their own lives. While this paper will avoid a deep statistical survey-
method analysis, the reader should keep in mind that the manner of mea-
suring poverty has, unfortunately, become a partisan issue. This debate is
critical, if somewhat hastily addressed here, because it creates a difficulty
not only in measuring poverty, but also in linking empirical data to con-
clusions as a result of the categorical difference in measuring against a
fixed and elastic poverty line.' 3 One method essentially emphasizes
widespread, uniform macroeconomic growth to prove poverty reduction,
whereas the other considers that growth dispositive of poverty reduction.
2. Poverty's Pervasiveness
Forgetting for a moment the difficulty in reaching a consensus about
absolute and relative poverty, the pervasiveness of poverty is an equally
important consideration. The two countries employed for this case study,
Nicaragua and Honduras, are both among the least-developed nations of
the Americas.14 Both are also, according to the United Nation's Human
11. Id. at 9-10.
12. Id. at 4.
13. See Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Nina Pavcnik, Trade, Inequality, and Poverty:
What Do We Know? Evidence From Recent Trade Liberalization Episodes in De-
veloping Countries 8 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10593,
2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/W10593.
14. Or they exhibit the lowest development indicators as supplied by the United Na-
tions. Guatemala is actually lower than Nicaragua and Honduras, but for some
reason is not eligible for the IMF's PRGF fund, so it was not considered in this
discussion. Eligibility will be discussed in a later section of this paper. Nicaragua
is ranked 112th on the Human Development Indicator's list, while Honduras is
ranked 116th. Guatemala is ranked 117th. United Nations Human Development
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Development Indicator rankings, countries of medium development,
ranked higher than some seventy-one other countries.' 5 Despite seem-
ingly developed status worldwide, these countries are still classified as
developing and feature a huge percentage of impoverished citizens; 72
percent of the 1998 Nicaraguan population lived below the poverty line,
according to the Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) method of quantifying
poverty, compared with 48 percent in Honduras using the same method.16
What is necessary to sustain life is more difficult to obtain in these coun-
tries. Marred by past economic mismanagement that led to today's shaky
economies, 17 these two countries face a number of developmental chal-
lenges. In spite of these shortcomings, both have attempted to wade
through the various solutions to poverty, raising their country's esteem
among the international marketplace, while solving domestic issues at
home. 18 They have both entered into a free trade agreement with the
United States and sought additional loans through the PRGF.
1I. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND POVERTY
CAFTA-DR was signed into U.S. law in 2005.19 Also in 2005, two of
CAFTA-DR's signatories underwent review pursuant to their loans from
the World Bank/IMF under the PRGF.20 But for now, this section will
focus on the general manner that free trade agreements, like CAFFA-
Report Office, Human Development Indicators tbl.1 (2005), http://hdr.undp.org/
reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_HDI.pdf#search=% 22human% 20development%
20indicators%202005%22 [hereinafter HDI].
15. Most of which are in Africa and Asia. Id.
16. According to each country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper statistics conducted
separately in 2001. The UBN method is used because it is the only one provided
by both countries. Nicaragua considers 47.9 percent to live below the poverty line
based on a different method, while Honduras considers 66 percent of their country
impoverished on an income standard. The disparity in numbers is based on the use
of two different standards of measurement; the lower one considers poverty in
reference to houses that lack basic needs. These figures vary based on what
method is used, and, in addition, are buffered by the urban poverty figures. That is
because the rural incidence of poverty in these countries is generally much higher
than in urban areas. NICARAGUA PRSP, supra note 7, at 6. REPUBLIC OF HONDU-
RAS, POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPER 9-10 (2001), http://www.imf.org/Ex-
ternal/NP/prsp/2001/hnd/01/083101.pdf [hereinafter HONDURAS PRSP],
17. See HDI, supra note 14, at tbl.14. The highest gross domestic product per capita of
the past thirty years was recorded, for both countries, in the late 1970s, prior to the
tumultuous 1980s. The then-governing Sandinistas are largely blamed for Nicara-
gua's current poverty struggles but still appear on party ballots in the country's
free elections of the past decade. Additionally, the Sandinistas were most infa-
mous for their ties to the Soviet Union, threatening armed conflict with the United
States. This period of turmoil no doubt contributed to a period of economic stasis.
See NICARAGUA PRSP, supra note 7, at 8. Honduras, on the other hand, suffered
rampant inflation due to fiscally irresponsible governmental regimes during the
1980s, and even after efforts were made to curb the high inflation, it still hovered
around 30 percent in 1995. See HONDURAS PRSP, supra note 16, at 14.
18. See NICARAGUA PRSP, supra note 7; see also HONDURAS PRSP, supra note 16.
19. Press Release, The White House, President Signs CAFTA-DR (Aug. 2, 2005),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050802-2.html.
20. Note the years of the Annual Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Reports. See NIC-
ARAGUA PRSP, supra note 7, at 1; see also HONDURAS PRSP, supra note 16, at 1.
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DR, attempt to reduce poverty. For those who have avoided U.S. politics
for the past fifteen years, free trade agreements are essentially tariff re-
ductions and a part of globalization. 21 They typically remove trade barri-
ers on most (those not specifically designated as sensitive) agricultural
and consumer products with the goal of maintaining healthy competition
and creating a more efficient marketplace across international borders.
2 2
The inquiry is best prefaced by an analysis of what CAFTA-DR sets
out to do in addition to its place in the history of free trade agreements.
That setup is best followed by a comparison to language and situational
analyses of other free trade agreements and their documented effects on
reducing poverty. This comparison will incidentally raise the issue linking
empirical data on poverty to free trade agreements, but it will also raise
issues about the presumption of linking poverty reduction as a concept to
free trade agreements. This section will conclude with predictions for
CAFTA-DR's future effects on poverty reduction in its signatory coun-
tries, particularly Nicaragua and Honduras, and the considerations in-
volved in making such a presumption.
A. BACKGROUND ON CAFTA-DR
CAFTA-DR arrives at a time when much of the world is embracing an
increasingly open period of trade. This trend towards a global economic
market was sparked by trade initiatives with the purpose of binding every
country to the tenets of open mercantilism, such as those of the World
Trade Organization and other regional, bilateral free trade agreements.
With these bilateral free trade agreements in mind, we will begin our dis-
cussion on CAFT'A-DR.
1. A Free Trade Agreement of a Familiar Nature
No discussion on the history of free trade agreements in the Americas
can be complete without at least some reference to the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed by the United States, Canada,
and Mexico. 23 NAFTA is still recent history, and the decennial economic
analysis and reviews are only just now rolling through. Considering
NAFTA is important to a complete understanding of CAFTA-DR, be-
cause most economists note the similar nature of NAFTA and CAFTA-
DR, and some purport that NAFTA has been an utter failure in terms of
reducing poverty. 24 "Free trade agreements, like CAFTA-DR, could
21. Goldberg & Pavcnik, supra note 13, at 1.
22. U.S. OFFICE OF TRADE REP., CAFTA FACTS: MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE RE-
GION'S RURAL POOR, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/
CAFTA/BriefingBook/asset-upload file268_7676.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2006)
[hereinafter NEEDS OF RURAL POOR].
23. The North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1999), available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/Policy/NAFrA/nafta.
html.
24. Laura Carlsen, Presentation at Asian Regional Workshop on Bilateral Free Trade
Agreements, The Price of Going to Market (Sept. 19, 2005), http://americas.irc-
online.org/pdf/reports/0509market.pdf.
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have distributional implications involving various income groups. In par-
ticular, some argue that free trade agreements could have an adverse im-
pact on the poorest segments of the population since these agreements
could compress their employment opportunities and wages. ' 25 While
NAFTA has doubled the trade dollars between the United States and
Mexico, 26 others say that it has left subsistence crop farmers in southern
Mexico unable to compete with lowered crop prices.27 Additionally,
nearly all agree that CAFTA-DR is a free trade agreement of NAFFA's
mold, even if there are disagreements about what that means for the sig-
natory countries. 28
While CAFFA-DR may not be a particularly revolutionary addition to
the free trade agreement scheme, it does demonstrate a change in the
international trade dynamic in the ten years since NAFTA was signed
into effect between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Some econo-
mists say that NAFTA itself will have a negative impact on CAFTA-DR,
pointing out that there have been a number of changes to the CAFTA-
DR signatory countries' tariffs already, either in reaction to NAFTA or in
anticipation of CAFTA-DR itself.29 In other words, CAFTA-DR marks
the firm handshake on already-transpired reduction of tariffs and foreign
investment between the signatory countries.30
2. The Public Relations Literature on CAFTA-DR
In addition to the historical developments that led to CAFTA-DR's
ratification, consider the rhetoric that took place in the background of
CAFTA-DR's ratification process. The Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, in promoting CAFTA-DR, lists a whole host of comparative
literature on CAFTA-DR's strengths, notably its ability to reduce poverty
among the Central American signatories. 31 These short texts, while more
or less brochures, are extremely important for linking poverty reduction
to CAFI'A-DR's goals. 32
25. Markus Rodlauer & Alfred Schipke, Central America: Global Integration and Re-
gional Cooperation 22 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 243, 2005) (em-
phasis added), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/243/index.htm.
It is important to note that these editors do contend that some of the negative
impacts of NAFTA have been a result of the peso crisis of 1995, and some econo-
mists have presented data showing that this resulted in an overall economic down-
turn for Mexico. But the editors point out that the least affected areas of Mexico
were those that embraced open trade. Id. at n.34.
26. Id. at 10.
27. Carlsen, supra note 24, at 2.
28. Id.; see also Rodlauer & Schipke, supra note 25, at 9.
29. Rodlauer & Schipke, supra note 25, at 9 n.12.
30. Daniel Griswold & Daniel Ikenson, The Case for CAFTA: Consolidating Central
America's Freedom Revolution 4 (CATO Inst.'s Trade Briefing Paper No. 21, Sept.
2004).
31. U.S. OFFICE OF TRADE REP., CAFTA BRIEFING BOOK, http://ustr.gov/Trade-
Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/BriefingBook/SectionIndex.html.
32. These public relations pieces are vital to the understanding of framework that un-
derpins free trade agreements as mechanisms for poverty reduction. As will be
seen in the next section, poverty, the word, never appears in CAFTA-DR's text.
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One of the most highly touted correlations between CAFTA-DR and
poverty is that farmers in both countries will find a greater market for
their goods with the dissolution of trade barriers.33 Manufacturers and
consumers in both countries can then select the lowest priced goods,
thereby saving the manufacturers and consumers costs, making their
money stretch further and making them less impoverished. 34 But it
stands to reason that if certain lower priced goods are in the United
States, as many are, then the competing farmers in impoverished coun-
tries will lose their market altogether. The framers of CAFTA-DR have
attempted to offset this problem (one of many complaints leveled against
NAFTA) by allowing signatories to maintain tariff restrictions on certain
industries, either temporarily or permanently.35 These protective tariffs
range from controversial protections, such as sugar in the United States,
to other crops, such as white corn in Central America.36 Other crops will
lose their tariff protection over a measured period of time, providing a
more gradual transition to free trade to allow certain farmers more time
to develop new job skills or to transition from job to job.37
Interestingly enough, the World Bank has also issued its own com-
ments on CAFTA-DR's potential beneficial effect on poverty.38 Accord-
ing to the World Bank President, "[t]his agreement will help secure and
expand the access of Central American nations to their largest trading
partner and help provide the potential for increased trade and investment
in the region-critical factors in boosting economic growth and reducing
poverty. '3 9 This report essentially repeats the language of the U.S. Trade
Cf Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to Economic
Growth and Development?, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 285 (2003) (discussing linkage as a
concept connecting economic growth to free trade agreements).
33. NEEDS OF RURAL POOR, supra note 22.
34. Id.
35. Id. In the U.S. Trade Representative's discussion on meeting the needs for the
rural poor, the industries of white corn, potatoes, and onions are mentioned. What
is not mentioned is the U.S. sugar exception. One of the most notorious examples
of how this tariff maintenance can be politically charged and a back-door for pro-
tectionism is seen in the U.S.' continued tariff restrictions on imported sugar,
which is a major industry for the Central American countries. This will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in the analysis of the text for CAFTA-DR, but "[a] true
free-trade agreement would remove the barriers that prevent the Central Ameri-
can region from capitalizing on the advantages it has in sugar production so that
America's food processors, beverage producers, and confectionaries could capital-
ize fully on their own advantages." Griswold & Ikenson, supra note 30, at 6.
36. NEEDS OF RURAL POOR, supra note 22.
37. Id. Such an argument can be easily attacked. All but the youngest of such workers
who suffer to lose industries may be ill-suited for any other area of employ, largely
because skilled jobs may require training that is too costly to expend on an aging
farmer.
38. WORLD BANK GROUP, CAFTA-DR: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CEN-
TRAL AMERICA (2005), http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/LAC/LAC.nsf/PrintView/EF
19E9E2E78A00458525702D006DOE7E?Opendocument.
39. Id. The World Bank's equation for reducing poverty as a result of a free trade
agreement also includes several actions to be taken by the nations themselves,
such as increasing infrastructure, educational spending, and transparency. This list
will echo almost perfectly in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers issued by Nic-
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Representative: that CAFTA-DR will offer the rural poor cheaper prices
on certain goods.4
0
B. CAFTA-DR's LANGUAGE ON POVERTY
When browsing the text of CAFTA-DR, the careful reader may note
that the word poverty never appears once in the entire text. 41 Before
sending hate mail to the author for reading about a correlation between
poverty and CAFrA-DR when there is no mention of poverty in the en-
tire document, read more deeply into CAFrA-DR's language. The pre-
amble does contain euphemistic language to the effect of reducing
poverty. The signatory governments to CAFTA-DR resolved to:
CREATE an expanded and secure market for the goods and services
produced in their territories while recognizing the differences in their
levels of development and the size of their economies;
ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for business plan-
ning and investment;
CREATE new opportunities for economic and social development in
the region;
PROTECT, enhance, and enforce basic workers' rights and
strengthen their cooperation on labor matters;
CREATE new employment opportunities and improve working con-
ditions and living standards in their respective territories;
... [and]
PRESERVE their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare. 42
So, while CAFTA-DR may not contain the word poverty per se, it does
seek to develop these countries by expanding their markets, protecting
their workers, and improving living standards in the signatory countries.
Considering that one of the signatories, the United States, is the tenth
most developed country in the world, and another, Costa Rica, is the
forty-seventh, the replacement of the term poverty with the euphemistic
phrase improved standards of living makes some sense.43
The reasons for recapitulating a good portion of the CAFTA-DR pre-
amble are not limited to the discussion of the euphemistic replacement of
the word poverty. It is important to note this desire to raise living stan-
dards occurs in the preamble but does not occur elsewhere in CAFTA-
aragua and Honduras to be covered in the section on the PRGF provided by the
World Bank and the IMF.
40. Id.
41. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1.
42. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at pmbl.
43. HDI, supra note 14, at tbl.1. Because of the development of the U.S. economy
(and to a lesser extent that of Costa Rica) the channel of foreign direct investment
should be considered. Remember that CAFTA-DR asks that each signatory be
mindful of the size of their economies.
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DR's text. This omission highlights the pretextual nature of this goal.44
Because there is no specific provision mandating that poverty be reduced
(and what would one look like if there were?), there is no directly action-
able, binding provision in CAFTA-DR to hold any government or agency
accountable for raising living standards. Poverty reduction, as a real con-
cept, only exists explicitly in the public relations pieces accompanying
CAFTA-DR's legislative process. Additionally, it adorns the preamble in
spirit, but poverty reduction is found nowhere (either in spirit or explic-
itly) among the provisions of CAFTA-DR. Suffice to say, poverty reduc-
tion is merely a hope used to fuel passage of these agreements, and such
hope is founded on the presumption that more money flowing into a gov-
ernment will equate to poverty reduction.
Returning to the preamble, its text ties increased living standards, i.e.,
poverty reduction, to this particular free trade agreement. The goals of
CA-'FA-DR profess to create not only secure markets for trade by re-
stricting inhibitions, tariffs, and easing customs duties but also to create a
connection between trade openness and raised living standards. 45 The
connection between these higher living standards and free trade lies in
the "new employment opportunities" created by the agreement. 4 6 The
feasibility of this correlation between open markets and improved living
standards via employment can depend on whether the more developed
countries can freely invest in the less-developed countries. After all, the
whole purpose of a free trade agreement is to remove the barriers to
trade and promote a more efficient marketplace. Part of this arrives in
the form of CAFTA-DR's specific provisions regarding foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI).
To analyze this assumption further, let us assume that the first tenets
are true that FDI will occur if restrictive borders are opened. Some data
shows this already occurs in the Central America region.47 One of the
several factors inhibiting FDI in shaky economies is the fear of expropria-
tion or freezing of the business assets by preventing exchanges from local
to foreign currency. 48 CAIFTA-DR contains language intended to pre-
vent such expropriation in chapter ten.49
To summarize the preamble: by removing trade restrictions, CAFTA-
DR creates secure markets, promotes direct investment, and offers new
employment opportunities within a country. So the argument follows: if a
44. See Paul, supra note 32.
45. CAFTA-DR is not the first trade organization purporting such a correlation exists.
The language is very similar to the World Trade Organization's stated purposes.
Id.
46. Looking again at the Preamble of CAFTA-DR, it is these new economic opportu-
nities that will raise living standards (and working conditions). CAFTA-DR, supra
note 1, at pmbl.
47. Rodlauer & Schipke, supra note 25, at 16-17 (demonstrating the amount of FDI in
the CAFTA-DR region).
48. This is what is addressed in the Preamble by the language of "commercial frame-
work." CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at pmbl.
49. Id. at ch. 10.
582 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 12
totally closed, protectionist country with ripe capital and raw sources sud-
denly changes its policy to one of complete openness, with guarantees
against a return to such protectionist trade policies, trade will be en-
couraged, creating new flows of capital and jobs to this country that has
been starved of outside investment. 50 What occurs is essentially a balanc-
ing of interests, a stripping away of inefficient markets and a replacement
with avenues of trade. The trend parallels the large-scale version of the
emerging national marketplace in the United States, where largely self-
sustaining agrarian families began relying on avenues of trade rather than
their own work product to sustain their lives, until eventually their own
individual work product ceased to exist. It required those families to de-
pend not on internal output but on a functional exchange of capital for
services.
C. THE EFFECTS ON POVERTY THROUGH CAFTA-DR
(AND U.S. MONETARY BACKING)
While many argue that this style of free trade agreement will create
more inequality across the Americas, some see hope beyond the short
history of NAFTA, which was hindered both by the 1995 peso crisis and
the bull-to-bear market transition in the United States.51 Because
NAFTA has proven susceptible to volatile markets, it remains to be seen
how CAFTA-DR will affect investment and the voluntary and corporate-
level influx of U.S. dollars there in the short term. And, keep in mind
that this market openness is inconclusive when it comes to directly reduc-
ing poverty. But one measure of change that could help to reduce pov-
erty even further is the amount of U.S. federal spending going to assist
the rural poor of the signatory countries.
CAFTA-DR is not simply a piece of wishful legislation for reducing
poverty. CAFTA-DR has been coupled with several funding initiatives
for trade capacity building and rural development. 52 These funds are
provided in a manner similar to the IMF PRGF funds, but are issued
50. While this exact argument is not stated elsewhere, it is nevertheless the commonly
accepted situation that underlies claims about free trade. While several econo-
mists and law review authors have questioned this from the perspective of general
economic growth, they all consider this assumption to be the principal argument
for free trade. See Rodlauer & Schipke, supra note 25, at 24. (comparing NAFTA
and the specific economic theories underlying free trade); Paul, supra note 32, at 2
(discussing the idea that free trade is often an assumption to economic growth).
51. See Rodlauer & Schipke, supra note 25, at 23.
52. U.S. OFFICE OF TRADE REP., CAFTA FACTS: FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR CAFTA-
DR, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Briefing-
Book/asset-upload filel2l_7786.pdf#search=%/o22cafta%/o20policy% 20brief% 20
june%202005%20trade%20representative%20united%20states%22 (last visited
Sept. 2, 2006) [hereinafter FINANCIAL SUPPORT]; U.S. OFFICE OF TRADE REP.,
CAFTA FACTS: THE FACTS ABOUT IMPROVING LABOR CONDITIONS, http://www.
ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/CAFA/Briefing-Book/asset-upload-
file192_7854.pdf#search= % 22cafta %20policy%20brief% 20july% 202005 % 20trade
%20representative%20united%20states%22 (last visited Sept. 2, 2006) [hereinaf-
ter IMPROVING LABOR CONDITIONS].
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directly from the U.S. government. 53 Of these funds, $215 million has
been granted to Honduras and $175 million has been granted to Nicara-
gua.54 In total, CAFTA-DR countries will stand to receive several billion
dollars from these various agencies over the next few years.55 These
loans are there to increase the effect CAFTA-DR has on poverty reduc-
tion in these countries. Without them, it can easily be understood that
there could be no means for facilitating a change to a more efficient mar-
ketplace or for providing the retraining or basic education to welcome
new industries in these less-developed countries.
1. Nicaragua and CAFTA-DR
This portion of the paper will seek to uncover some of the individual
problems confronting Nicaragua with respect to international trade, pri-
marily with the United States. By understanding and distinguishing Nica-
ragua from some of the other CAFTA-DR signatories, a better analysis
of the trade framework can be made. This section seeks to consider the
information relating to Nicaragua, as has been cultivated separate and
apart from the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs),
which will be discussed in the next topic.
Of all CAFTA-DR signatories, Nicaragua exports the least percent of
its GDP to the United States at 5 percent. 56 Nicaragua is, however, the
most agriculturally dependent of the CAFTA-DR signatories, netting 30
percent of its GDP from this sector.5 7 Agricultural dependence "appears
to accentuate the poverty problem," according to some economists, and
Nicaragua is no exception, having a poverty rate of around 50 percent
(higher if considering the UBN method). 58 These statistics help demon-
strate that Nicaragua is a farmer-friendly market. Because we have al-
ready discussed how CAFTA-DR will affect the price of goods, driving
them down, it could be said that CAFTA-DR has the potential to create
major problems for Nicaraguan farmers. Being so heavily dependent on
nationally-produced agricultural products, tariff reductions will bring
about cheaper imported agricultural products, simultaneously creating
"welfare gains for a significant majority of households ... because of the
reduction in prices, while producers of the sensitive agricultural products
could experience welfare losses."' 59 Either way, CAFTA-DR will create
53. FINANCIAL SUPPORT, supra note 52.
54. Id.
55. Id.; see also IMPROVING LABOR CONDITIONS, supra note 52 (discussing the funds
that will go directly from the U.S. government to enforcement of International
Labour Organization provisions regarding fair labor standards in the region).
56. Alfred Schipke, Building on CAFTA, 42 FIN. & DEV. 4, Dec. 2005, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/20O5/l2/schipke.htm.
57. Rodlauer & Schipke, supra note 25. at 23. This source will be used continuously
throughout this section, because it presents general macroeconomic data in refer-
ence to CAFTA-DR. Keep in mind that the data for this source refers solely to
the export markets between the United States and these individual countries and
does not include data about trade between the CAFTA-DR countries themselves.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 23 n.38.
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more competition for these farmers and may force them into other sec-
tors, creating a market for consumers.
In recent history, Nicaragua has been one of Central America's most
volatile economic climates, due to the political turmoil of the 1980s as
well as its dependence on agrarian products. 60 Conversely, since the
Sandinista regime, Nicaragua's exports and imports sectors have grown
considerably since 1994, with about a 3 percent growth between 1994 and
1996 alone.61 Because of this, Nicaragua's trade openness (i.e., its exports
and imports as compared to GDP) has almost doubled in the past ten
years.62 The size of Nicaragua's GDP makes it especially susceptible to
increases in trade, which could be substantial as a result of CAFTA-DR.
That being said, among CAFTA-DR signatories, Nicaragua receives
the smallest amount of gross FDI from the United States, even though
that small amount is about 9 percent of the Nicaraguan GDP.63 In other
words, although Nicaragua receives a fraction of the FDI that Costa Rica
or the Dominican Republic do from the United States, that fraction is still
a large portion of the Nicaraguan GDP, much larger in percentage terms
than either Costa Rica's or the Dominican Republic's FDI/GDP ratio.
Between 2001 and 2002, Nicaragua did receive more than Honduras in
terms of gross FDI, but it is unclear if that is the sign of a trend or a
statistical anomaly.64 Any change in FDI as a result of CAFTA-DR
could therefore substantially affect the country's GDP and, therefore, the
country's ability to fund projects to help reduce poverty. For reference,
Nicaragua has pledged approximately 28 percent of its GDP to funding
the PRGF programs in 2004 and 2005, and its predictions for future suc-
cess incorporate a projected increase in GDP of 33 to 50 percent over the
next five years.65
In summary, Nicaragua's economy could undergo major expansion as a
result of CAFTA-DR. Despite the optimism Nicaragua shows in its pro-
jected GDP, there are, however, a number of obstacles to such a booming
economy. The performance of the U.S. economy and its needs for expan-
60. See NICARAGUA PRSP, supra note 7, at 14. For example, there is still litigation as
a result of the Sandinista regime's expropriations in the Nicaragua of the 1980s.
The National Trade Estimate Report of 2005 for Nicaragua listed this problem as
one of the major inhibitors of FDI in the country. For example, many U.S. foreign
property owners who lost their property during the Sandinista regime have sued in
Nicaragua only to have their property remain in the hands of the former
Sandinista military officials who expropriated the property in the first place. Nev-
ertheless, FDI was still marginally increased between 2002 and 2003 for Nicaragua.
U.S. OFFICE OF TRADE REP., NICARAGUA, 2005 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE RE-
PORT 1, 7 (2005) available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Re-
portsPublications/2005/2005_NTEReport/asset-upload-file7l9_7486.pdf
[hereinafter NICARAGUA TRADE REPORT].
61. Rodlauer & Schipke, supra note 25, at 13.
62. Id. at 11.
63. Id. at 16-17 tbl.2.7-.8.
64. Id.
65. REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 85 tbl.7.2 (2005),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/crO5440.pdf [hereinafter NICARAGUA
PRSP II].
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sion, the perceptions of CAFTA-DR's anti-expropriation provisions and
Nicaragua's stability among U.S. foreign investors, and the ability for Nic-
aragua to manage and reap benefits from those that do invest will all
weigh heavily in whether CAFTA-DR has a positive impact on the Nica-
raguan GDP. And, while an increase in GDP has already been predicted
by Nicaragua for use in its PRGF, the question remains whether such an
increase is likely to occur. 66 As we will see with Honduras, its growth in
the past ten years is indicative of a market that may have peaked (or is
merely recuperating from natural disasters).
2. Honduras and CAFTA-DR
Honduras, while having several successful and peaceable transfers of
power since the early 1980s, has also had its share of fiscal irresponsibility
and governmental corruption as recently as 1993.67 The last few presi-
dents have, however, strived to curb governmental spending and infla-
tion, which was reduced to 9 percent in 2004, down from the 30 percent
range ten years prior.68 Some poverty surveys place Nicaragua at the
forefront of Central American poverty, while others say that Honduras
has poverty around 80 percent.69 Recent history includes the devastation
of Hurricane Mitch, which devastated the Honduran economy in 1998.70
With the Honduran economy rebounding as of the end of 2004,7 1 it re-
mains to be seen how CAFTA-DR will affect Honduras, or whether it
will affect Honduras at all.
Honduras, like all Central American countries, has traditionally had an
agriculturally dependent economy, with agricultural exports to the
United States dwarfing manufacturing exports three to one from 1994 to
2001.72 As of 2001, Honduras and Nicaragua were both lagging behind
the rest of Central America, who have since balanced their export indus-
tries more evenly among agriculture and manufacturing with respect to
the United States. 73 But Honduras' total exports to the United States
were some five times that of Nicaragua's. 7 4 One of the most telling statis-
tics is the fact that Honduras and Nicaragua are the lowest of all the
CAFTA-DR signatories when it comes to the manufacturing business in
66. Id.
67. U.S. State Dept., Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Background Note: Hon-
duras, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/eilbgn/1922.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006) [herein-
after Honduras].
68. IMF Concludes 2005 Article IV Consultation with Honduras, PIN No. 05/51 (Apr.
13, 2005), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2005/pnO551.htm (last
visited Sept. 2, 2006) [hereinafter IMF Concludes 2005]; cf Press Release, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, IMF Approves Second Loan for Honduras under the
ESAF, IMF, Doc. No. 95/8 (Jan. 31, 1995), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/sec/pr/1995/pr9508.htm.
69. Rodlauer & Schipke, supra note 25, at 23.
70. Honduras, supra note 67.
71. IMF Concludes 2005, supra note 68.
72. Rodlauer & Schipke, supra note 25, at 15 tbl.2.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 14.
586 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 12
the emerging markets. While each hold up to par in the export of food
stuffs, Honduras exports ten times as many apparel goods as Nicaragua
does. 75 This maquiladora industry has garnered its fair share of criticism
among workers' rights groups, despite becoming a huge industry in the
country.76 For example, one such leader recently noted the problems
with the industry, in spite of the hundred thousand or so jobs it creates as
follows: "the salaries are low and the social cost provoced [sic] by the
maquilas are high. And the maquila industry is a volatile capital. It is
here today[,] but tomorrow it could be in Nicaragua. ' 77 Not only that,
but the maquila companies also receive government tax incentives, which
at the least creates a perception of mistrust between the government and
the poor that are supposed to be helped by the new jobs.78
This perspective may explain the fact that Honduras' export business to
the United States can be so large, yet the quality of life for many citizens
is so low compared to other countries. In other words, an increase in FDI
to Honduras in the form of new industries may not do much for poverty.
While this paper will not enter into the debate of the maquiladora indus-
try, the ire it has raised simultaneously raises some questions and doubts
about the correlation between poverty reduction and increased FDI and
trade. Perhaps these investments are a necessary step in developing an
international marketplace. Some, particularly those in the maquiladora
industries, are looking forward to CAFTA-DR as a means of opening the
door to U.S. FDI.79 But that still does not connect the money going into
creating and maintaining these industries with the impoverished Hondu-
ran citizen, particularly those that live outside of the new plant's locale.
The government's leniency and bargaining to draw businesses to Hondu-
ras may not be doing much for the impoverished Honduran citizen, ei-
ther. The paper will return to consider the role of the government in the
next section on the PRGF. But for now, the period of trade precipitating
CAFTA-DR raises as many new questions as it answers old ones.
3. Conclusions Regarding CAFTA-DR
Poverty reduction is a spiritual goal of CAFTA-DR, but no one, not
even free trade's biggest proponents, can pretend that this correlation is
proven or valid. It is true that in the most elastic of economic model
societies, factories or industries will move to their most efficient position
over the course of trade openness, and new jobs and markets will open
and be available to the previously impoverished. It is also true that the
situations in Nicaragua and Honduras are different enough to show that a
75. Id. at 14 tbl.2.
76. Anette Emanuelsson, Between Frustration and Hope, HONDURAS THIS WEEK,
Mar. 13, 2006, available at http://www.americas.org/item-25846.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Wash. Times Advertising Dept., CBI Enhancement Determines Future of Hondu-
ran Maquila Industry, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2000, available at http://www.inter-
nationalspecialreports.com/theamericas/00/honduras/4.html.
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catalyst such as open trade can be dwarfed when compared to factors that
put it at a disadvantage. Some extraneous factors that are very difficult
to pinpoint include: Mexico's large, natural border with the United
States; the more developed government of Costa Rica; the sense memory
effect that foreign direct investors feel when dealing with a country such
as Nicaragua; and the remaining U.S. sugar tariffs. In light of these fac-
tors, CAFTA-DR may be too late in leveling the field between Mexico
and these countries.
At this point, it is difficult to say whether the expropriations legislation
and tariff removals will be enough to draw FDI to these countries. Cer-
tainly, some industry speculators in these countries hope so. But only
then will CAFTA-DR have any effect (albeit an indirect) on reducing
poverty in Nicaragua and Honduras. Given the fact this change is occur-
ring in a world fraught with other factors, including the IMF lending pro-
gram that will be discussed in the next section, short-term feedback on
CAFTA-DR's success or failure is likely going to be construed according
to the wishes of whoever is calculating the data. After all, notwithstand-
ing the inconsistencies of poverty data, omitting one relevant fact from
these equations can spin the data in a whole new light. As with NAFTA,
the quest for empirical truth for a causal connection between poverty re-
duction and free trade is likely to remain unanswered. It is more likely
that a general trend of expansion will lead to some overall growth and
poverty reduction, but it will not be CAFTA-DR alone that accomplishes
this goal.
III. THE IMF
Now, this paper will leave the first macroeconomic model and focus
instead on the second: seeking welfare from a higher authority. This con-
cept of welfare is not new to society. But, with the advent of a global
marketplace, the past forty years has seen larger pseudo-humanitarian
groups crop up with the mission of bringing whole countries out of the
lower social strata and providing money and blueprints for modern infra-
structure, such as the IMF. While free trade agreements are bilateral and
between two self-interested parties, international lending agreements like
the IMF, lie (presumably) outside the realm of self-interest, taking on a
more direct approach to confront poverty and improve living standards.
This paper shifts its focus to address the background of the IMF, its role
as a lending institution and how its lending programs have changed both
in terms of increased frequency and towards a more high-risk lending
system.
A. BACKGROUND ON THE IMF
Created in 1945, the IMF began as a lender to member governments,
who become member governments through a complex loan process that
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the IMF pays up front, with a return rate of interest.80 These loans serve
to cover a member country's temporary balance of payments deficits and
are also used to preserve a system of pegged exchange rates.81 But this
lending may not be the IMF's entire purpose, and indeed, discerning what
the IMF's actual, current purpose is has sparked much debate. The IMF
presents itself as an entity "to promote international monetary coopera-
tion, exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements; to foster ec-
onomic growth and high levels of employment; and to provide temporary
financial assistance to countries to help ease balance of payments adjust-
ment."' 82 At least, 'that is the paraphrase of its Articles of Agreement.
Again, there is nothing in this charge to denote a commitment to poverty
reduction, but one need only glance at the tree of IMF programs to see
poverty reduction has become one of the IMF's primary goals.83 The or-
ganization is clearly striving for a role as a humanitarian aid provider and
country developer.
To best see this change and document how it precipitated, the key focus
should be on 1971, when the IMF abandoned its exchange rate system
and moved off of the gold standard.84 According to some scholars, this
marked the point that:
80. IMF Factsheet, Apr. 2006: IMF Quotas, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/
quotas.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006). The IMF issues Special Drawing Rights
(SDRs), a form of currency based upon the size of the member country's quota
(pre-1971, the SDR was based on the gold standard). These determine how much
the country can withdraw from the IMF. From the way that the IMF classifies
these member governments, there is much room for change and further that grey
area, including the ability to change a country's status to grant it special treatment.
The Meltzer Commission has recently provided an expos6 on the SDR Depart-
ment. Adam Lerrick, Opening a Back Door to Foreign Aid: The SDR Department
at the IMF, CARNEGIE MELLON Q. INT'L ECONS. REP., (Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/sdrdept.pdf. For the record, the United States has
the highest quota of all IMF member countries, and this fact will feature more
heavily in the later subsections of this IMF discussion, particularly in light of who
actually pays for IMF aid. The amount of loans by the United States through the
IMF is 1 billion more than the total amount borrowed by all developing countries.
81. IMF Factsheet, Apr. 2006: IMF Lending, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/
howlend.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
82. The IMF's purposes are put forth in paraphrased form for purposes because of
ease of reading. IMF, ABOUT THE IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm
(last visited Sept. 2, 2006). It is important to consider the entirety of the provisions
from the IMF's Articles of Agreement. These provisions are largely the same, but
it is important to note that the IMF's Articles of Agreement state no purpose as to
poverty reduction, increased living standards or any other type of nation-develop-
ing schema. Unlike CAFTA-DR, there is no euphemistic or altruistic language
pertaining to poverty reduction in the original Articles of Agreement. Such
changes have been added and will be discussed further in this paper. Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. I, opened for signature Dec.
27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/aa/aa0l.htm.
83. IMF, IMF FINANCES, http://www.imf.org/external/fin.htm (last visited Sept. 2,
2006).
84. Lawrence J. McQuillan, The Case Against the International Monetary Fund, Hoo-
VER INST., Sept. 29, 1999, http://www.hoover.org/publications/epp/2845951.html.
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[t]he IMF lost its only function and should have closed shop.... But
few things are so permanent as government agencies, including inter-
national agencies. The IMF, sitting on a pile of funds, sought and
found a new function: serving as an economic consulting agency to
countries in trouble-an agency that was unusual in that it offered
money instead of charging fees. 85
Most of the IMF's detractors cite to the chameleon nature of the IMF's
purposes as one of the major reasons that the IMF has outlived its useful-
ness. 86 The IMF itself defends its changing methods, stating "[our] pur-
poses have remained unchanged but [our] operations-which involve
surveillance, financial assistance, and technical assistance-have devel-
oped to meet the changing needs of [our] member countries in an evolv-
ing world economy. '8 7
B. IMF LENDING: CHANGING THE NATURE OF THE AGENCY
Because the IMF is a lending institution first and foremost, this portion
of the paper will discuss the background of the IMF as a lending institu-
tion, the manner that it has historically used to lend money, and the way
that it has changed its lending practices over the past decade. The IMF
accomplishes its purposes with short-term loans called quotas, which are
funded by regular member contributions from its 184 member countries
and are directly related to the economic size of the country.88 Quotas
also determine the voting rights each country has in the IMF.89 Each
country is required to contribute its full quota upon joining but may pro-
vide up to 75 percent of that amount in local currency (the remainder
should be in gold). 90 In exchange, a country has a right to borrow an
amount equal to about 25 percent of its quota, provided it is running a
balance of payments deficit, or in other words, could not pay its outstand-
ing balances. 9 1 As a member nation draws beyond its IMF quota, it
comes under increased supervision from the IMF to correct the dise-
quilibrium in its balance of payments. This loaning system was consid-
ered safe because the loans were relatively low-risk. It existed simply to
help maintain stability in countries by helping member countries pay
their debts. By making these sorts of deals, member countries could re-
ceive immediate funds from the IMF but only at a rate short of what they
had invested into the IMF, and the member countries themselves had to
put money up front, paying back at a predetermined interest rate.92
85. Milton Friedman, Markets to the Rescue, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1998, at A22, availa-
ble at http://www.imfsite.org/recentfin/rescue.html.
86. Id.
87. ABOUT THE IMF, supra note 82.
88. IMF Factsheet, Apr. 2006: Where the IMF Gets Its Money, http://www.imf.org/
external/np/exr/facts/finfac.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. IMF Lending, supra note 81.
92. Id.
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One such incident that garnered a whole host of complaints occurred at
the turn of the century in Argentina. The IMF approved of Argentina's
Convertibility Plan in April of 1991, which gave Argentina the ability to
back every conversion of peso at parity with the U.S. dollar, despite (and
because of) raising Argentine inflation during the same period. 93 Exter-
nal debt rose from $62 billion at the end of 1993 to $124 billion at the end
of 1998, while the GDP only grew about 25 percent. 94 This situation was
problematic.
The debt rose that high during a period of growth, and secondly, the
government was unable to raise tax revenues to pay the increasing debt.95
Third, the GDP growth was due to non-recurring privatization revenue,
which meant it would not likely continue. 96 Fourth, the IMF was watch-
ing the whole thing transpire. 97 The IMF ignored substantial amounts of
off budget loans borrowed by the government. 98 Argentina's growth was
as a result of unsound fiscal policy and spending (an embarrassment be-
cause the IMF had the ability to press the government to change its fiscal
policy and was monitoring the situation through the Convertibility
Plan).99
How this relates to the IMF's new lending scheme relates to what hap-
pened as a result of Argentina's inability to pay its debt. Argentina had
continuously failed to reign in its fiscal spending, despite efforts to correct
its habits.100 When Argentina threatened sovereign default, the IMF de-
cided instead to give $14 billion of a combined $40 billion to bail out
Argentina from defaulting on all of its creditors.10 1 This method has been
called "lending into arrears" and "seems to suggest that default shifts the
balance of power in favor of the debtor. °10 2 This sort of risky loan ma-
neuver nearly caused the capsize of Argentina's economy, its creditors,
and potentially the IMF, but it also called into question the loan policies
of the IMF. Additionally, the IMF's rollover of Argentina's debt may
have created precedent for other nations to threaten sovereign default on
93. Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy, INST. FOR
INT'L ECON., Mar. 25, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/eco-
nomics/ma int2/mussa.pdf.
94. Id. at 8 tbl.1. The figures were calculated by simply multiplying the percentage of
total public debt by the GDP for the indicated years. The increase in GDP was
approximately $62 billion for this same period, yet the amount of debt effectively
swallowed this gain, as it grew in the same exact amount.
95. Id. at 10; cf Rodlauer & Schipke, supra note 25 (demonstrating that none of the
CAFTA-DR signatories, including Nicaragua and Honduras, have been able to
raise their tax revenues over 16% of GDP).
96. Mussa, supra note 93, at 9.
97. Id. at 11-13.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1.
100. Id. at 15-21.
101. Id. at 21.
102. Anna Gelpern, After Argentina, INST. FOR INT'L ECON., Sept. 2005, at 8, 9, availa-
ble at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb05-2.pdf. This article also discusses the
plight of individual creditors suing the defaulting nation for judgment. In spite of
the $62 billion windfall, these creditors in the United States managed to wrack up
only $15 million in damages through lawsuits. Id. at 4.
2006] POVERTY REDUCTION AND GROWTH FACILITY 591
their debts as well. After all, the IMF's purpose is to prevent these na-
tions from stiffing their creditors. 103 Readers should keep this in mind as
indicative of the IMF's changing fiscal policies, when considering the
loans that the IMF makes to even more impoverished nations.
C. THE PRGF
Lending in the IMF has changed with the advent of certain facilities or
lending instruments. 1° 4 The PRGF is one of the newest entries in the
IMF's stable of loan agreements, but the high-risk nature has created
some controversy to the investors, while the meddlesome conditions cre-
ate controversy on the side of the impoverished nation.10 5 Now, in spite
of the recent trouble with Argentina, "[t]he IMF provides financial assis-
tance to low-income countries experiencing balance of payments
problems through its [PRGF].' 10 6 Founded in 1999, the PRGF is the
IMF's way of reducing poverty and forcing member nations to spend
IMF-loaned money on their nation's poor.10 7 Additionally, less-devel-
oped countries with insufficient funds must basically become an IMF
member, because private lenders require these countries to first acquire
an agreement with the IMF before any of their lending agreements will
be made. 10 8 These IMF agreements require structural adjustments forced
on the borrowing country, making foreign aid a prerequisite.10 9
Regarding the creation of the PRGF, the IMF's own publications state
that the PRGF was designed as a response to United Nations' concerns
and goals to halve poverty by the year 2015, manifested by the Millen-
nium Development Goals.'10 While the IMF presents a recapitulation of
103. ABOUT THE IMF, supra note 82.
104. IMF Lending supra note 81.
105. PRGF, supra note 2.
106. IMF Factsheet, Apr. 2006: How the IMF Helps Poor Countries, http://www.imf.
org/external/np/exr/facts/poor.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
107. PRGF, supra note 2.
108. Third World Traveler, 20 Questions on the IMF, MULTINAT'L MONITOR MAG.,
Apr. 2000, available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/IMFWB/2OQuestions
IMF.html. In their defense, the IMF says "PRGF-supported programs are de-
signed to cover only areas within the primary responsibility of the IMF ... [includ-
ing] advising on prudent macroeconomic policies and related structural reforms
such as exchange rate and tax policy, fiscal management, budget execution, fiscal
transparency, and tax and customs administration." PRGF, supra note 2.
109. PRGF, supra note 2 (discussing the structural reforms); see also How the IMF
Helps Poor Countries, supra note 106 (discussing the PRSPs, the basis for the
structural reforms that the PRGF operates). While the PRSPs will be further dis-
cussed, it is clear that they impose certain structural requirements on member
countries. This paper will discuss other requirements of the PRSPs, which effec-
tively give the IMF much more control over the shape and development of these
emerging markets. See Where the IMF Gets Its Money, supra note 88 (for a dis-
cussion on why the PRSPs focus on certain key health and economic issues, i.e.,
the Millennium Development Goals).
110. IMF Factsheet, Apr. 2006: The IMF and the Millennium Development Goals,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/mdg.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006). Ob-
viously, the United Nations is defining poverty as absolute, rather than relative,
poverty with a fixed poverty line. Under a relative poverty schema, poverty could
never be reduced by half without taking half of the impoverished persons and
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the Millennium Development Goals, the incorporation of them into the
definition of the PRGF and PRSPs, submitted by member states, appears
to be no more than altruistic.11' Because the IMF is not a member of the
United Nations, no one has asked the IMF to aid in the realization of
these goals. While the IMF is, "[t]ogether with the World Bank [and
twenty-five plus other entities], assess[ing] progress towards the MDGs
[Millennium Development Goals] through an annual Global Monitoring
Report," there is nothing in the IMF's own factsheet entitled "The IMF
and the Millennium Development Goals" that demonstrates a mandate
from the United Nations to use the PRGF loan structure to meet these
goals.112 The purpose of helping other nations achieve the Millennium
Development Goals vis-A-vis the PRGF is still clear, even if a mandate
from the United Nations is not. But, even with a clear intent, the IMF
may not necessarily be approaching poverty reduction in the most benefi-
cial or productive manner. That, however, is best seen by studying the
application process. Just as food stamps cannot buy prescription drugs,
these loans are restricted and require a lengthy application process by the
member country.
D. PRSPs
Founded in 1999, the PRSP is the IMF's way of forming a contract with
developing member nations.113 These large, 100-plus page documents use
empirical data, various quantifiable goals, and projections to show how a
nation will reduce internal poverty. 114 The PRSP combats two of the
IMF's problems with one bulky document. On the one hand, they silence
detractors of the IMF's high-risk lending facilities by providing sound fis-
immediately placing them with means equal to the low income (but not impover-
ished) persons. Halving relative poverty is, at the least, a more difficult task than
halving from an absolute poverty line. Given the fact that halving absolute pov-
erty by 2015 is not likely to be a met goal, it seems likely that the United Nations
were not aiming for the more difficult task.
111. How the IMF Helps Poor Countries, supra note 106 (showing that the PRGF is
based on a member nation's filing of a PRSP, which "[i]n addition to economic
policies, PRSPs typically cover structural and social policies that are needed to
improve health and education, safeguard the environment, and combat HIV/
AIDS, malaria, and other diseases."); cf. The IMF and the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals, supra note 110 ("The first seven goals focus on eradicating extreme
poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender
equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal
health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; and ensuring environ-
mental sustainability."). Other than the promotion of gender equality, these goals
are largely symmetrical.
112. The IMF and Millennium Development Goals, supra note 110; see also U.N. Econ.
& Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Inter-Agency & Expert Group on MDG Indicators,
The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005, delivered to the General Assem-
bly, U.N. Doc. DPI/2390 (May 2005), available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/pdf/
MDG%20Book.pdf (listing the other twenty-five plus entities that help the IMF
and World Bank to provide data for the report).
113. IMF Factsheet, Sept. 2005: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, http://www.imf.org/
external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006) [hereinafter PRSP].
114. See, e.g., NICARAGUA PRSP, supra note 7; HONDURAS PRSP, supra note 16.
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cal policies and data to base developing-country loans on, while they also
force the hand of the recipient developing country to agree to a strategy
drafted by their own hand, so as to prevent any future misunderstanding.
Filing a PRSP, however, is a lengthy process, requiring a developing na-
tion to outline with some degree of specificity how it plans to the use the
PRGF loan.115 While this may seem a daunting task to a nation wrought
with debt and the inability to provide basic necessities to 50 percent of its
population, the IMF again provides aid, by having its own staff assist in
the drafting of the PRSP. In spite of whatever assistance they provide,
the PRSPs are founded on the principle that they are drafted by the coun-
tries themselves, making them national strategies. 116 As was mentioned
earlier, Nicaragua and Honduras have both filed PRSPs. Nicaragua and
Honduras' filings were conducted within one month of each other in
2001.117 Each of these country's PRSPs follow a similar rubric, but the
differences are contextual to each country's Millennium Development
Goal deficiencies.
1. Nicaragua's PRSP
Nicaragua filed its first PRSP in July 2001, but the process had been
underway a year earlier when Nicaragua filed its interim PRSP in August
2000.118 The framework for the PRSP covers the gamut of Millennium
Development Goal problems, compiles data from Nicaragua's past, and
sets the goals for Nicaragua over the course of the next five years. Nica-
ragua identifies much of their problematic history and their problem ar-
eas, while providing short and medium-term goals. For example,
Nicaragua's access to census data and poverty information, which is criti-
cal to assessing and determining the trajectory of poverty in the country,
was simply not conducted during the 1980s decade of civil war and un-
rest.1 19 As a result, the country has made many macroeconomic efforts to
boost its economy and encourage trade, such as removing price controls
set up in the previous regime.1 20 While the first PRSP itself is not as
helpful in chronicling Nicaragua's change due to the short period of data
held prior to its drafting, the annual reports, and the present re-filing of
Nicaragua's second PRSP in November of 2005 have opened a window
115. PRSP, supra note 113.
116. Id.
117. NICARAGUA PRSP, supra note 7; HONDURAS PRSP, supra note 16. It will be dis-
cussed later, but Nicaragua has since filed a replacement PRSP in November 2005,
which is interesting because it came just before the data on its 2005 goals (from
their initial PRSP) would be available. The next section will cover the resubmis-
sion of Nicaragua's PRSP in greater detail. See NICARAGUA PRSP II, supra note
65.
118. NICARAGUA PRSP, supra note 7. at v.
119. Id. at ix para. 2 (stating that Nicaragua's 1990 per-capita income level had plum-
meted to the same as it was in 1960); see also id. at 5 (discussing the difficulty in
assessing income because of the lack of follow-ups on poverty indications and in-
come information and pegging 1993 as the ground-zero point for most of the fu-
ture changes to Nicaragua's poverty and income data levels).
120. NICARAGUA PRSP, supra note 7, at 16 para. 64.
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for measurement. 12 1
The initial PRSP does, however, provide data for the period from 1993
to 1998, which cites changes to poverty and attempts to ascribe causes to
the slight shifts in numbers. 122 For example, favorable exports of sugar
and coffee have helped rural farmers shrink poverty by 7 percent over
this period. 123 Although Nicaragua's poverty nationally is 50 percent, the
rural poverty in 1993 was over 70 percent. 124 Additionally, Nicaragua
provides evidence of the country's economic downturn in the form of the
horrendous decline in real per capita GDP from 1977 to 1993, where it
fell from 11,000 cordobas to 4,100 cordobas.125 Other measurements of
pre-PRSP Nicaraguan poverty focus on the other Millennium Develop-
ment Goals such as education, reducing family violence, hurricane-dam-
age prevention, and malnutrition. 126
The Nicaraguan PRSP compares the poverty reduction strategy of the
1980s with its current developmental goals based on market-based eco-
nomics. Veiled in this is a comment about the failed redistribution of
economic wealth that accompanied the Sandinista's attempts at social
programming. 127 The strategies implemented by Nicaragua include plans
to spend on poverty-related outlays and to increase school enrollment
and evaluations, prenatal health care, children's health care (such as polio
vaccinations), national potable water, and access to sanitation. 128 The
first PRSP outlines Nicaragua's intention to use the PRSP money to aid
the nation's tourist capacity and increase production-assisting technolo-
gies, demand-driven programs, and access to the nation's rural sections
that feature the most poverty. 129 Regarding problems of sanitation, nu-
trition, and healthcare, Nicaragua plans to decentralize the education sys-
tem, giving power and a new managerial system to local schools.' 30 In
addition, it plans to spend money on new health centers in areas with the
121. NICARAGUA PRSP II, supra note 65.
122. NICARAGUA PRSP, supra note 7, at 8 tbl.1 (demonstrating that, from 1993 to 1998,
poverty was reduced in most rural sectors but rose significantly in the coastal ur-
ban sectors. This data seems to demonstrate that a downshift in profits from farm-
ing could possibly create a problem when CAFTA-DR forces competition between
local, rural farmers and imported products from the United States).
123. Id. at 7 para. 25. Keep in mind that CAFTA-DR does nothing to reduce tariffs on
U.S. sugar imports, so these farmers will likely find that the open trade of CAFTA-
DR is really not so open. This creates a problem for those seeking to bank on the
further reduction of poverty through increases in the agricultural production of
sugar as an export crop. See NEEDS OF RURAL POOR, supra note 22.
124. Id. at 7 fig.2. It should be noted that extreme poverty also dropped by 7 percent,
lowering the ratio of rural extreme poverty to rural poverty in the process.
125. Id. at 13 fig.4. Additionally, the real per capita GDP has risen slowly but steadily
to almost $5,000 cordobas in 2000.
126. Id. at 9-13 paras. 31-51.
127. Id. at 17 para. 69.
128. NICARAGUA PRSP, supra note 7, at 21-27.
129. Id. at 28 paras. 104-08. Additionally, the government notes CAFTA-DR's ability
to reduce poverty, as well, by eliminating tariffs. These plans are extremely vague,
but they do much to present Nicaragua as serious about reforming the country's
spending towards capitalistic endeavors.
130. Id. at 30-32.
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highest maternal and infant mortality rates, to increase access to potable
water and childcare programs, and to help prevent malnutrition in chil-
dren under two years of age.' 3 '
While these goals have the appearance of effective sound policy deci-
sions, it should be noted that they are rather vague with regard to proac-
tive measurements to be employed by the Nicaraguan government. The
first Nicaraguan PRSP seems more concerned with setting up a measure-
ment of poverty rather than reducing poverty. 132 Because of Nicaragua's
deficiency with respect to social data, they seem instead to be investing in
tools to analyze the poverty problem more fully before implementing a
response strategy. There is no specific mention of how goals will be real-
ized for those existing problems. The PRSP does not demonstrate some
of their basic claims, such as what sites would be better for health centers
or explanations for why previous measures have failed. Rather, the
PRSP seems to be setting up the manner that Nicaragua may answer
these questions. That being said, some of the correlations between pov-
erty reduction and commerce found in the PRSP are unconvincing. For
example, privately developed hotels in Managua do not themselves cre-
ate a tourist industry, and such an industry is not likely to affect the rural
poor, save through government spending. 133 Additionally, it is unknown
how the government plans to implement some of the more costly-sound-
ing measures, such as nutrition.134 Though it claimed that reducing igno-
rance was the key to reducing malnutrition, it did not say how
distribution of supplements and elementary school curriculum changes
would be implemented to improve nutrition awareness. 135
Notwithstanding such vague promises, the National Development
Plan-the second PRSP, according to the IMF-presents mixed results
over the three years of data conducted between 2001 and 2004. Nicara-
gua opens with an Executive Summary saying it allowed reforms of the
economic branches of the government and also that "the fight against
poverty has not been highly effective" and that this second PRSP is "de-
signed to overcome the shortcomings" of the previous PRSP.136 Nicara-
gua's Executive Summary attempts to honestly present a summary of its
prior successes and shortcomings, though the PRSP's accompanying data
presents few definite trends by itself. Nicaragua had a few years of lower-
than-expected GDP, with two years of decreasing GDP, followed by an
131. Id. at 32-33.
132. Id. at 44 para. 180 (discussing the costs of monitoring and evaluation systems, not
the responses to such systems).
133. Id. at 28 para. 104 (mentioning the fact that hotels have been built as an indicator
of future economic success, which is arguably an indicator of economic growth and
some new jobs).
134. Id. at 26 para. 96 (offering no explanation beyond saying that chronic malnutrition
is bad and alluding to the possibility that spot nutrition surveys will be conducted).
135. Id. at 33 para. 129 (saying that because the impoverished allowed farm animals to
share potable water, the government's efforts to increase potable water was wasted
by the actions of the impoverished persons themselves).
136. NICARAGUA PRSP II, supra note 65, at 1.
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increase in 2004.137 Additionally, the advent of the PRSP actually
seemed to slow economic development. While the percentage of citizens
living in extreme poverty dropped by over 2 percent between 1998 and
2001, the percentage of citizens living in extreme poverty rose by nearly a
percentage point between 2001 and 2004.138 Similar changes occurred
with the infant mortality rate, which dropped by 10 percent between 1998
and 2001, but rose by 2004.139 Some goals that did see improvement be-
tween 2001 and 2004 were noticeably lower than the 1998 to 2001 time
frame, such as the maternal mortality rate.140 Additionally, the rate of
primary schooling did increase slightly between 2001 and 2004, but it
should be noted that it is increased sharply between 2001 and 2002, with a
steady decline in the interim. 141 Some of this may be attributable to lack
of growth in the entire economy, which Nicaragua has attributed to fall-
ing agro-export products and the 2001 banking crisis.' 42
Nicaragua has essentially reconstructed its earlier PRSP into a new and
improved PRSP. Nicaragua recapitulated its earlier statements regarding
fiscal policies with vague promises of earmarked funds towards certain
problems. But, because there is no specificity in the earlier PRSP, there
is no accountability for mismanagement of funds in the later document.
For example, the first PRSP says:
the government's [PRGF] program is ambitious; it will require out-
lays of about US$1.1 billion for the years 2001-2005[ ] or US$230
million yearly, of which US$100 million will be earmarked for com-
pliance with the selected indicators .... While this PRSP cannot de-
scribe in detail the multitude of projects and programs included in
the [PRGF], a summary of some of the key, major programs and
projects is provided.143
The vague description of the programs, such as "US$90.0 million will
expand the coverage and quality of the rural health system . . . [with a
goal] to improve maternal/infant and adolescent care provided by the pri-
mary health network," makes the program meaningless when such ex-
penditures do not present results; as the later PRSP simply says that
collecting data in this area "continues to be a challenge" and a brief note
that new health centers have been constructed. 144 The effect on poverty
is therefore taken for granted, because these documents possess no
137. Id. at 7 para. 41.
138. See id. at 8.
139. Id.
140. For example, the maternal mortality rate for children under five decreased by 10
percent in the first three-year period but only by 3 percent in the following period.
Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1 para. 5. As discussed earlier, though sugar was not expressly mentioned,
tariffs and competition through increasingly open trade might have led to a down-
turn for the Nicaraguan economy, which showed extreme vulnerability to its coffee
and sugar exports.
143. NICARAGUA PRSP, supra note 7, at 49 para. 193.
144. Cf id. at 50 para. 197; see also NICARAGUA PRSP II, supra note 65, at 48 para. 249,
61 para. 306, & n.138.
2006] POVERTY REDUCTION AND GROWTH FACILITY 597
means for either the IMF or the casual reader to hold Nicaragua account-
able for its spending practices.
2. Honduras' PRSP
Honduras' PRSP was filed one month after Nicaragua's in August
2001. Since then, Honduras has filed two subsequent PRSPs, the latter
occurred in March 2005.145 Unlike Nicaragua, Honduras' plan did not
include for re-filing a new PRSP in 2005. Honduras is generally con-
cerned with the same problems that plague Nicaragua, such as reduction
of rural poverty and aid in land access by rural families to promote their
own labor-intensive sources of funding. To combat this, Honduras has set
up interior overseers for its poverty reduction efforts, outlining specific
government entities such as the Poverty Reduction Fund and the Advi-
sory Council for Poverty Reduction, both have specific charges and pow-
ers to help implement the PRSP.146 In a sense, one major difference
between Honduras and Nicaragua is that Honduras' poverty figures, such
as infant mortality rates and education statistics, are continuous through-
out the 1980s with no statistical gaps.1 47
We have already discussed briefly the character of Honduras economy
in the section on CAFTA-DR. Before we consider the PRSP factors as
they relate to poverty reduction, one other major extraordinary factor
that affects Honduras' data is the devastation from Hurricane Mitch,
which itself raised poverty in the country by nearly three percentage
points in 1998 and also destroyed productive assets that contribute to its
GDP.148 Even though the GDP and per capita GDP shrank as a result of
Hurricane Mitch, Honduras' economy has since rebounded.149
In its attempt to combat poverty and to satisfy the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals, Honduras has, like Nicaragua, outlined a set of targets in
keeping with the Millennium Development Goals. 150 In fact, the struc-
ture of Honduras' PRSP is very similar to that of Nicaragua's PRSPs,
citing the history of the nation, the baseline indicators for poverty, the
targeted areas for the Millennium Development Goals, the
macroeconomic reforms and infrastructure improvements, and the social
plans that the country will or has enabled to reduce poverty.151 In addi-
145. REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS, HONDURAS POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY REPORT
2004 (2005), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/crO582.pdf [hereinafter
PRSP REPORT].
146. HONDURAS PRSP, supra note 16, at vi-vii paras. 31-34 (showing the nature of these
two organizations, how they will be formed, who will comprise the legislative bod-
ies, and what their purpose will be).
147. See id. at 38-39.
148. Id. at 18-20 (noting also that the costs of repair from Hurricane Mitch are in the
hundreds of millions for dwellings and even more for productive assets). While
the Nicaraguan PRSP made mention of Mitch too, it did not provide figures attrib-
utable to the hurricane's damage.
149. Id. at 21.
150. Id. at 51-53. These include, reduction of poverty, increasing school enrollment,
and reducing malnutrition.
151. Id.; cf NICARAGUA PRSP, supra note 7.
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tion to the similarities in structure, the similar difficulty in attacking or
addressing the merits of the expenditures is equally difficult in the Hon-
duras PRSP and its 2004 Progress Report. Honduras' 2004 Progress Re-
port (filed in early 2005) shows that poverty has dropped only slightly in
the years since 2001.152 In this latest PRSP report, figures on these in-
dicators show that some improvement has been made regarding GDP
and per capita GDP growth. 153 But, with respect to the poverty and ex-
treme poverty rates, Honduras saw a decline overall, although both pov-
erty and extreme poverty were short of the goals set up by the initial
PRSP.154
The data for the individual goals is not measured qualitatively but
through strict adherence to goals set up by the initial PRSP. For example,
"[i]n education, the goals for preschool coverage were met in 2003 and
2004. In 2003, coverage was 37.7%, surpassing the goal of 34.9%, and
36.0% coverage was achieved in 2004, again surpassing the 35.7%
goal."' 155 Reading these goals for this particular example raises a number
of questions, such as what criteria were used for setting the goals, does
coverage mean more children are covered geographically-speaking or
that more children are attending schools, and what is the quality of the
increase in preschool coverage, i.e. does this coverage mean that new
schools were erected or that students are being crammed into the same
number of classrooms. Such incremental changes, while positive for the
most part, are certainly less meaningful than if they had been coupled
with some further explanation. While progress has certainly been made
through the PRSP program in Honduras (and Nicaragua), the specificity
of data from these PRSPs does not lend itself to meaningful analysis.
Honduras does, like Nicaragua, at least name some of the programs
and amounts earmarked for certain industries, such as the Programa Na-
cional de Desarrollo Rurla Sustanable (PRONADERS). 156 This program
has provided water resources and rural development projects benefiting
nearly 300,000 families since the initial PRSP was filed. 157 Of note, the
descriptions and benefits of the PRONADERS programs and the other
152. PRSP REPORT, supra note 145, at 27 tbl.IV.4.
153. Id. As Honduras notes, the data between the 2003 and 2004 period was only eight
months, due to the unavoidable nature of the data they had. This limits the effect
of these indicators immensely, and Honduras promises more data will be delivered
soon. Id. at 28 para. 48. Making major judgments based on these indicators is
probably rash; the data in these indicators is from a very short period of time, and
it is unclear how much they will demonstrate about Honduras' capabilities or ef-
forts under the plan.
154. Id. These figures failed to meet the goal for both years, so when Honduras' pov-
erty rate dropped from 66 percent to 63.5 percent between the starting figure and
2003, the figure was already still 1.4 percent higher than it should have been.
When the poverty rate rose between 2003 and 2004, the gap between the goal and
the observed poverty rate was all the more pronounced at four percentage points.
155. Id. at 29 para. 49.
156. Id. at 44.
157. Id.
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Honduran programs are impressive, but they are not readily verifiable in
the PRSP.
3. Conclusion on PRSPs
The PRSPs are an interesting form of social reform in that they adopt
the framework of the United Nations with respect to measuring poverty
and its indicators, but they adopt the fiscal macroeconomic policies of the
IMF. While it is clear there is room for improvement, as even the IMF
admits, the IMF does and should continue to tweak the fairly nascent
PRSP system. Some of the problems evidenced by these countries are
the inability to meet stricter goals, the lack of specificity in some of the
country's PRSPs, and the fundamental lack of empirical evidence that the
PRSPs are viable poverty-reducing strategies.
Regarding the first point, countries like Nicaragua and Honduras obvi-
ously need to have goals to reduce their poverty, and entities such as the
IMF should be able to evaluate the usage of loans they make to these
nations. But the PRGF could stand to be improved. The Millennium
Development Goals in and of themselves are incapable of speeding up
the process of poverty reduction. The way that poverty is measured re-
quires many people who are unemployed, who have no education, or who
have no potable water to, within a generation, become educated, to
change eating, bathing, and other health habits, make more money than
ever before, and be recorded by the government as now living above the
poverty line. Once they are above the poverty line, the question of ine-
quality between these people and the wealthy members of society enters
the fray. In countries where poverty affects one-half to three-quarters of
the population, the task is certainly daunting.
Second, the PRSPs provide less in the way of evaluative functionality
because there is no framework for presenting how and where the money
lent by the IMF will be spent. Obviously, to institute such a requirement
would raise even more ire towards those already clamoring for the IMF
to stop imposing its will on governmental reform. But it would help to
have that sort of specificity recorded in the PRSPs. Without it, it is im-
possible to say whether a health center should have been placed in region
one or region two; actually, it is impossible to say where health centers
were installed at all. This complaint tugs at the balancing issue of how
much money, time, and effort the member developing countries should
spend on reporting, versus actually doing all they can to reduce poverty
with their money and shortness of time. American businesses have
shown how costly reporting has become under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
and this is a similar framework. Moreover, because the IMF has analysts
working with the member nations to provide assistance in gathering and
interpreting data, perhaps some of these evaluations take place in fact but
do not make the cut of the PRSP. Unfortunately, this inability to monitor
more effectively is a problem with the IMF loaning money to countries
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that need the funds so desperately that they do not have the time or spare
funds to accurately report what they are doing with the loan.
The IMF PRSP structure is also problematic in that the IMF merely
adopts the United Nations' data on poverty measurement and the United
Nations' poverty reduction goals as indicative of success. This complaint
targets a more fundamental node than what the member country does
with their loan. It drives at the principles behind the IMF's assumptions
on poverty reduction. In essence, there is little-to-no consensus on what
poverty is or how it can be reduced effectively. The IMF is willing to take
huge sums of money and throw them to the nearest developing nation
even if that money runs the risk of not making a difference. These PRSPs
and debt restructuring deals cost the other IMF member countries (prin-
cipally the United States) many billions of dollars. Because the IMF is
not qualitatively rating member nations' PRSPs, there is little room for
saying whether Country A performed within the bounds of their PRSP.
And moreover, there is no real way for the IMF to censure Country A for
how it uses these funds, because there is no foundation for saying that
Country A's methods are better or worse than the IMF's.
Additionally, the sheer volume of factors can easily create inconsisten-
cies in data over a three-year period. Whether it is the result of a political
climate, land monopolies, the wrong crop, a hurricane, or plain acts of
ludicrous, greedy fiscal policy, or criminal embezzlement, these countries
cannot simply be lifted out of these bad habits overnight, and sometimes
the data affected by them will last for much longer than a three year
period. While the IMF PRSP has demonstrated some effect in sobering
member governments up to the realities of their expenditures, the PRSP
is not a poverty-reducing mechanism in and of itself. It is a tool and a
system of checks and balances. The trouble is that there is no consensus
that it checks with enough specificity, or that it balances against a true
paradigm of poverty reduction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Comparing CAFTA-DR to the IMF's PRGF and PRSPs, the differ-
ences in how they go about addressing poverty are readily apparent, but
the effects are not. Seeking open trade with a neighbor versus receiving
money to fund your own business are entirely different frameworks. But
neither gives a clear indication about how it will cure deficiencies of the
nation's individual. Consider again the discussion about individual pov-
erty versus the national poverty. The first fallacy in this simple expansion
is the fact that a nation is not impoverished. Poverty solutions there con-
sidered the curing of its own defects to be like a human being curing its
own hunger. In reality, the nations themselves are seeking to cure many
individual instances of poverty on a large scale.
CAFITA-DR is a system that only indirectly addresses poverty, by way
of securing foreign capital investments and shifting markets in developing
nations. In a way, the impoverished individuals can be totally left out of
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the equation. This model rests on the presumption that markets will de-
velop efficiently and evenly among the varied CAFTA-DR signatories,
including satiating poor individuals. As has been casually mentioned,
CAFT'A-DR's theoretical basis for even development could be somewhat
flawed, not only because of pre-existing differences in social dynamics
among the different, lesser-developed countries (the pre-existing inequal-
ity that can create a shift in bargaining power), but also because of the
remaining tariffs that will not be removed as a result of lobbying among
certain groups, e.g., the sugar tariffs in the United States.
The IMF, on the other hand, takes a much more active stance on pov-
erty, making individual poverty reduction the direct function of its
PRGF. Unlike the result from CAFTA-DR, poverty reduction is likely
to occur. The degree that it will, however, is unclear. Like an individual
who has suffered lingering ailments from prolonged malnutrition, a na-
tion cannot simply heal itself and become whole overnight. Change takes
time, and it remains to be seen how effective per dollar spent these IMF
loan packages really are. As heartless as it may sound, billions of dollars
are given to these countries, largely by way of U.S. spending. This has
created much resentment in the wealthier nations that back the IMF. 158
Some IMF detractors feel that the loan process should be revamped and
converted into a grant program, whereby member countries earn grants
for improvements based on good behavior. 159 The reason for such a
change is the prevention of bogging member countries down in unpay-
able debt. This would serve as a "[c]ounter to the trend of lending blan-
ket sums for indeterminate governmental plans.' 160 It remains to be seen
how the rising costs of the IMF will be offset by the benefits it affords
these member countries by offering them low-interest loans over ex-
tended periods of time. But, regardless of the degree, it appears the loans
are having some effect on reducing poverty and promoting stability in the
region. Perhaps the costs of the PRGF are cheaper in the long-run than
another armed conflict in the region. To the impoverished individual re-
siding in their country, it definitely makes a difference.
158. The Meltzer Commission says that the IMF costs taxpayers $1.9 billion per year,
an amount absent on the budget and deficit. The changing nature of the IMF,
from a short-term, low-risk lender to a long-term, high-risk lender is cited as the
reason the IMF now costs taxpayers money. Because the PRGF and the like
charge a lower interest rate, the amount costs the U.S. taxpayers more than the 3
percent of a U.S. Treasury Bond. Adam Lerrick, Funding the IMF: How Much
Does it Really Cost?, CARNEGIE MELLON Q. INT'L ECONs. REP., Nov. 2003, at 1,
available at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/11-18-03.pdf.
159. Adam Lerrick & Allan H. Meltzer, Grants: A Better Way to Deliver Aid, CAR-
NEGIE MELLON Q. INT'L ECONS. REP., Jan. 2002, at 1, available at http://www.
house.gov/jec/imf/grant.pdf.
160. Id.
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